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Studies of Western philosophical receptions of Indian thought often begin by noting 
the contrary evaluations of Hegel and Schopenhauer: whereas for Hegel the cultural 
products of the subcontinent were merely records of humanity’s first rude attempts to 
liberate thought from immersion in its material environment,1 Schopenhauer main­
tained that Hinduism possessed “the wisest of all mythologies”2 and the Upaniṣads 
“the highest human wisdom”.3
However, it is rarely noted in studies of their respective receptions of Indian 
thought that Schopenhauer, in agreement with Hegel, similarly excluded it from 
the history of philosophy and denied it proper philosophical status.4 Although the 
theoretical assumptions supporting this common categorization were slightly dif­
ferent in the case of each thinker, the effects were identical in practice, insofar as 
they equally resulted in relegating Indian thought to the status of a precursor to Euro­
pean phi losophy. 
Schopenhauer’s criteria for doing so were two: initially, he argued that the pro­
found insights of Indian wisdom were articulated in myths and allegories (such as 
māyā) that required decoding into the clear and precise technical language proper to 
philosophy.5 In addition to this, he tended to suggest that the narrative medium of 
India’s most ancient texts, such as the Upaniṣads, was intrinsic to the way in which 
its thinkers entertained their idealistic doctrines, as “utterances” stemming from an 
“immediate illumination” of their minds.6 In lieu of logical proofs, Indian texts of­
fered “pictorial and even rhapsodical” narratives,7 in which a sage communicates 
esoteric wisdom to a disciple — such as when Uddālaka Āruṇi employs a series of 
kinesthetic pedagogical strategies to awaken Śvetaketu to the mystery that the ātman 
is the unseen essence of the cosmos, as undetectable but all­pervasive as salt dis­
solved in water.8
Schopenhauer thought that the non­philosophical character of Indian wisdom 
was especially evident in what, for him, was one of its most profound teachings — 
its doctrine of idealism and the related contrast between appearance and reality. 
 Although he acknowledged that ancient India had been the birthplace and fount 
of  idealism,9 he also regarded it as specifically “the philosophy of modern times”,10 
insofar as it had not been established as a permanent philosophical possession until 
Kant. The ancient sages of India may have been the first to grasp the distinction 
 between appearances in our heads and objective reality, but they “based their con­
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tentions merely on a universal perception of the world; they produced them as the 
direct utterance of their consciousness, and presented them mythically and poeti­
cally rather than philosophically and distinctly.” Kant “expressed the same doctrine 
in an entirely new and original way,” and thus made it “a proved and incontestable 
truth through the most calm and dispassionate presentation.”11
This was, at least, Schopenhauer’s ‘official’ or directly expressed view; in the 
present article I propose to investigate whether his system contains sufficient phi­
losophical resources to sustain it. Schopenhauer never explicitly outlined or de­
fended his criteria for elevating Kant’s rational and conceptual idealism over the 
intuitive and poetic idealism of India, but examination of the epistemological and 
metaphysical portions of his writings throws some light on his view. I will there­
fore begin with an outline of Schopenhauer’s understanding of the logical and 
 epistemological warrants of transcendental idealism, before passing over to his meta­
physical theory of the causal obstacles that have prohibited its general acceptance — 
both the psychological causes embedded in human nature as such, and the cultural 
conditions that have specifically conspired to marginalize idealism in Europe. After 
this, I will summarize his account of the origin and status of idealism in India, and 
then close by returning to the question whether his official view of the contrast be­
tween these two species of idealism holds water on its own terms, or whether — in the 
absence of substantive philosophical reasons — it stands as evidence of a residual 
and rather cavalier bias in favor of modern Occidental philosophy on Schopen­
hauer’s part, a bias that belies his otherwise indisputable enthusiasm for and venera­
tion of Indian thought.
The Epistemological Warrant of Idealism
Schopenhauer opened his “chief work” with the remark that idealism is indubitably 
true: we know not “a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that 
feels an earth”, so that “everything that exists for knowledge, and hence the whole of 
this world, is only object in relation to the subject, perception of the perceiver, in a 
word, representation.”12
This is a very bold introduction to a work of philosophy, but a direct and philo­
sophically satisfying proof of it is not found in The World as Will and Representation. 
In lieu of proofs or arguments, Schopenhauer’s readers are periodically confronted 
with the mantra that subject and object are mutually implicatory — that a subject is, 
by definition, something that represents objects, and that an object is, in turn, neces­
sarily represented by a subject.13 Alternatively, Schopenhauer referred his readers to 
the works of Kant, specifically the Transcendental Aesthetic in The Critique of Pure 
Reason, whose “proofs” that space, time, and the causally active parts of matter are 
appearances in a subject are claimed to “have such a complete power of conviction 
that I number its propositions among the incontestable truths.”14
However, having attributed incontestability to Kant’s idealist “proofs”, Schopen­
hauer qualified this in the following sentence with the remark that, properly under­
stood, Kant’s works consisted less of proofs than “the distinct expression of the fact” 
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of idealism itself.15 At this point, the exasperated reader is likely to conclude that 
Schopenhauer’s equivocation over whether Kant proved that the world is my repre­
sentation or merely indicated it as a fact is a rhetorical smokescreen, employed to 
conceal the poverty of idealism’s epistemological warrant.
The equivocation might be clarified (albeit perhaps not solved) with reference to 
Schopenhauer’s conception of the nature of philosophical knowledge and the func­
tion of proof within its methodological economy. He claimed that demonstration or 
proof consists of
a logical deduction of the asserted proposition from one already settled and certain — with 
the aid of another as second premise. Now that proposition must either have itself direct, 
more correctly original, certainty, or logically follow from one that has such certainty. 
Such propositions of an original certainty that is not brought about by any proof, consti­
tute the fundamental truths of all the sciences and have always resulted from carrying 
over what is somehow intuitively apprehended into what is thought, the abstract. They 
are, therefore, called evident, a predicate that really belongs only to them and not to the 
merely demonstrated propositions that, as conclusiones ex praemissis, can be called 
merely logical or consequential.16
Working from the assumption that proofs are logical inferences from original and 
unproved facts — implausible as this may seem — Schopenhauer regarded transcen­
dental idealism as founded upon a “fact”, albeit a fact of a very special kind. This 
“fact” is the datum of immediate conscious experience, which is the “representation, 
which contains and presupposes” both subject and object.17 When we reflect on the 
implications of this immediately intuited fact and attain that state of mind to which 
Schopenhauer gave the name “philosophical discernment” (philosophische Beson-
nenheit),18 we grasp that, although it might be possible to separate subject and object 
in the medium of abstract concepts, in actual concrete experience they are necessary 
correlatives and thus ontologically inseparable. When the necessary and inelim­
inable relation between these two poles of universal experience has been truly dis­
cerned, the philosopher is in a position to sketch out and deposit the implications 
of his insight in a system of concepts, the propositions of which will be derivatives 
from the immediate certainty, present to philosophical discernment, that the world is 
my representation.
Instead, therefore, of attempting to prove or demonstrate idealism, Schopen­
hauer thought it sufficient to refer to the immediacy of conscious experience and 
what it implies. His chief work therefore departs from an appeal to discernment and 
emphatic assertion of idealism, because his conception of philosophy’s sources 
and methods entails that it is a position that cannot be argued to but only from: only 
he who has “sufficient power of reflection to go back to the first elements of his con­
sciousness of things” realizes that he knows nothing but representations,19 the uni­
versal form of which is the division into subject and object. Their interdependence, 
Schopenhauer claimed, is like the propositions of Euclid — too immediate, certain, 
simple, and self­evident to be deduced from any another principle.20 To raise the 
simplicity and certainty of this immediately known truth or “fact” to the level of re­
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flection, and arrange both it and its corollaries in a system of concepts, circumscribes 
the remit of the philosopher, because
[i]ntuitively, or in concreto, every man is really conscious of all philosophical truths; 
but to bring them into his abstract knowledge, into reflection, is the business of the phi­
losopher, who neither ought to nor can do more than this.21
Obstacles to Idealism
However, alongside attributing immediate self­evidence to idealism, Schopenhauer 
was equally prone to expressing an embattled commitment to “the philosophy of 
modern times”, bemoaning the abiding dominance of commonsense realism within 
the general culture, as a consequence of which “decided idealism” was derided as 
a “paradox of certain abnormal philosophers . . . hardly worthy of serious consider­
ation.”22 But if, as he claimed, idealism is immediately and self­evidently true, then 
the overwhelming predisposition toward transcendental realism — the thesis that ob­
jects are independent of the subject — seems enigmatic and in need of explanation.
Since, as we have seen, Schopenhauer thought that a rational proof of idealism 
was both impossible and unnecessary, the only other option he had for explaining 
the dominance of commonsense realism was a psychological and causal account, 
which he conveniently found in his metaphysics of the will. According to this the 
will, as inner essence of all organisms and objects, strives blindly for survival, pres­
ervation, expansion, and duration of individual existence. As an appendage of ani­
mal life, the intellect is originally the will’s servant and cares for truth only insofar as 
it is compatible with the aforementioned principal ends of the will. As a result, the 
intellect has an innate tendency to ascribe real and independent existence to objects 
in order to envisage, if only in thought, the possibility of the will’s ultimate satiation 
through them. In the 1813 edition of his doctoral dissertation, composed while Scho­
penhauer was developing his metaphysics of will in his notebooks, he claimed that 
our psychological tendency to assign independent existence to objects
is one of the many proofs of the fact that so little in us is directed towards knowing. In fact 
everything is directed towards willing, so that, while as knowers we remain children, as 
willers we may be giants at any age.23
Realism is therefore the erroneous but “inborn” or “original disposition” of the 
intellect,24 serving the biological ends of the will­to­live and thus easily commended 
to those who lack discernment by “appearing to be founded on fact”; but, with the 
dawning of discernment, we realize that transcendental realism is nothing but “an 
empty castle in the air, since it skips or denies the first fact of all, namely that all that 
we know lies within consciousness.”25
It seems, therefore, that Schopenhauer thought that we are less in need of a 
positive proof of idealism than of a negation or diminution of the corrupting influ­
ences of the will’s disposition toward realism; once this has been achieved, discern­
ment is attained and the truth of idealism shines forth, as it were. Idealism only seems 
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counterintuitive to the natural intellect because this favors theories that satisfy needs 
rather than truth, which is why Schopenhauer consistently remarked that an intellect 
shot through with will is unsuited to philosophy.26 The condition for the latter, he 
argued, is an unnatural superfluity of intellect over will, as a result of which know­
ledge, not exhausted by the demands of willing, perceives things objectively, rather 
than as possibilities for the will’s satisfaction. Such ‘objective’ knowledge was, for 
Schopenhauer, the preserve of genius, whose “true nature . . . must lie in the com­
pleteness and energy of the knowledge of perception [der Vollkommenheit und En-
ergie der anschauenden Erkenntniß] ”,27 or its ability to apprehend simple, immediate 
and indubitably known “facts”. Genius is, of course, a rare state, which is why Scho­
penhauer acknowledged that not everyone who hears the idealist proposition “the 
world is my representation” is likely to accept it as true. However, he in whom dis­
cernment has arisen, and is therefore able to contemplate the world without attend­
ing to the dictates of his will and its nisus toward realism, will immediately see, 
perceive, or discern the truth of idealism.28
Culture and Idealism: The Case of Europe
Schopenhauer’s conception of idealism’s philosophical status was therefore twofold: 
whereas the thesis of subject­object interdependence is self­evident to the discerning 
intellect, the same thesis appears unsatisfying and implausible to the natural intel­
lect. He considered this twofold attitude toward idealism to be amply illustrated by 
its contrasting careers in India and Europe, for although he excluded Indian idealism 
from the history of philosophy, he also credited it with being the first appearance of 
this “fundamental view” on the planet, central to the metaphysical Weltanschauung 
of India from time immemorial and providing Indians with their basic orientation 
toward the world and life.29 This contrasts sharply with his account of the advent of 
idealism in Europe, where the dominant metaphysical outlook has been realist.30
Even the “divine Plato” was a realist in Schopenhauer’s view, for Plato’s Ideas 
were independent of the knowing subject.31 The realist tendencies of classical Greek 
philosophy had been subsequently confirmed and raised to the status of official 
teaching in the Middle Ages, as a result of which science and metaphysical spec­
ulation had been subordinated to theology and Judeo­Christian realism.32 The meta­
physics of Christianity presents the world of objects and knowing subjects as 
independent of each other and created out of nothing by an omnipotent deity. This 
cosmogony — completely contrary to the deliverances of discernment — not only ap­
peals to the “inborn realism” of the intellect determined by the will, but has also, 
argued Schopenhauer, been sustained by the social, political, and educational privi­
leges of the European priestly caste, who have sought to suppress the deliverances of 
discernment wherever they have arisen.33
In Schopenhauer’s view, the conditions for the possibility of a European version 
of idealism arose after the Reformation, when Descartes reasserted the independence 
of philosophy from Aristotle and the Bible and displaced realism by confining philo­
sophical certainty to immediate conscious experience.34 However, Schopenhauer 
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contended that, once Descartes had discerned the immediate, certain, and indubi­
table “fact” of idealism, he instantly shied away from its implications by reasserting 
the mutual independence of object and subject, allotting to each a heterogeneous 
mode of existence — as res extensa in the case of objects and res cogitans in the case 
of subjects. Contrary, therefore, to the standard historical interpretation of Descartes’s 
role in the history of philosophy, Schopenhauer maintained that the father of modern 
philosophy’s main contribution to the discipline was to re­establish scholastic real­
ism on a novel footing, independent of Aristotle and the Bible.35
The next figure to take up the cause of idealism in Schopenhauer’s survey was 
Berkeley, whom Schopenhauer credited as being the first European philosopher to 
formulate a bold challenge to the hegemony of realism by defining objects in terms 
of their perceivability (esse est percipi). But although Schopenhauer regularly hailed 
Berkeley as the “originator of the true and proper idealism,”36 he also regarded his 
assault on realism as partial and “confined to one point.”37 Parallel to Schopen­
hauer’s presentation of Descartes’s reaction to the deliverances of discernment, 
Schopenhauer maintained that when Berkeley attempted to express the content of 
his idealist intuition in concepts, he could not help but interpret it in accordance 
with the prevailing realist doctrines of God and the soul, thereby constituting the 
knowing subject as a substantive entity independent of objects.38 As a result, Berke­
ley’s immaterialism or spiritualism turns out to be little more than the shadow­side of 
materialism, and thus another species of noncorrelative realism.
Not until 1781, according to Schopenhauer, on the occasion of Kant’s publica­
tion of the Critique of Pure Reason, did “the fundamental idealistic view” obtain “the 
ascendancy in Europe, at any rate in philosophy”.39 Kant not only confirmed Berke­
ley’s claim that the object is conditioned by the subject materially — with regard to its 
very existence as object — but improved on Berkeley’s presentation by showing that 
the formal conditions of the object’s appearance — space, time, and causality — were 
also contributions of the subject.40 In addition to this, Kant corrected the one­ 
sidedness of Berkeley’s account by refusing to attribute metaphysical supremacy or 
independent existence to either subject or object, and thus established the correla­
tivism between them that is faithful to discernment and condensed in the principle of 
the compatibility of empirical reality and transcendental ideality.41
Schopenhauer’s reading of Kant’s idealism can hardly be considered orthodox 
or mainstream, for the majority of Kantian commentators have not similarly distilled 
from the Critique the thesis that objects have no existence apart from their appear­
ance in consciousness: oddly enough, Schopenhauer agreed! He thought that Kant 
had articulated full­blooded or “decided idealism” in only the first, 1781, edition of 
the Critique, in statements such as “if I remove the thinking subject the whole corpo­
real world must at once vanish: it is nothing save an appearance in the sensibility of 
our subject and a mode of its representations.”42 In subsequent editions, Schopen­
hauer alleged that Kant had diluted the originality of his insight to avoid ridicule.43 
He thereby “disfigured and spoilt” his “immortal” work, replacing it with a “self­
contradictory” second edition “whose sense could not be thoroughly clear and com­
prehensible to anyone.”44
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Schopenhauer argued that Kant had suppressed the “decided idealism” of the 
first edition by introducing a contrast between the ideal object as it appears in per­
ception and the real object apart from perception, thereby burdening his system with 
a tripartite ontology of represented object, non­represented object, and thing­in­ 
itself.45 And, in Schopenhauer’s estimation, Kant’s disfiguring concessions to realism 
did not cease there, for his surreptitious claim, “concealed under many different 
turns of expression,”46 that the thing­in­itself is the cause of bodily sensations, simi­
larly makes the forms and forces of the phenomenon, such as causation, real prin­
ciples operating independently of the subject.47
Schopenhauer’s allegation that Kant lost his nerve and diluted the “decided ide­
alism” of the first Critique might be taken as an illustration of Schopenhauer’s theory 
that realism is the “inborn” and “original disposition of the intellect”,48 providing a 
permanent temptation to deny philosophical discernment and argue one’s way back 
into the comforting womb of realism. We saw the same tendency at work in his ac­
count of Descartes and Berkeley, both of whom similarly drew back from the preci­
pice of idealism to reassert the claims of realism. Schopenhauer evidently regarded 
the deliverances of discernment as extremely fragile and prone to conceptual distor­
tion, because, as outlined earlier, he thought that the most important truths were 
“somehow intuitively apprehended” and only subsequently fixed in concepts. His 
perception of the chasm that separates immediate discernment of truth from its sub­
sequent thematization and proof in concepts, led him to argue that many of Kant’s 
idealist claims were “correct conclusions from false premises,”49 a phenomenon that 
occurs when
we have an immediate insight into a truth through a correct aperçu, but fail to find out 
and make clear the grounds of our knowledge, in that we are unable to bring them to 
distinct consciousness. For in the case of every original insight, conviction exists prior to 
the proof, which is only subsequently thought out.50
And, in addition to the permanent possibility that the philosopher’s own dis­
cernment will be distorted by the psychological effects of the will’s craving for real 
objects, Schopenhauer thought that the realist orthodoxies of Europe’s religious, edu­
cational, and cultural institutions rendered any spirited, public defense of idealism 
contrary to prudence: Berkeley’s philosophy invited the ridicule of Swift and John­
son; Kant diluted his idealism to avoid association with Berkeley; while Spinoza 
 suffered persecution and Bruno execution for promulgating a metaphysic that, al­
though not strictly idealist, similarly challenged the prevailing orthodoxy of Judeo­
Christian realism.51 Schopenhauer regarded the history of post­Kantian idealism as 
further evidence of European culture’s deep commitment to realism. Kant’s realist 
concession to the extra­phenomenal operations of causation led to Fichte’s philoso­
phy, which Schopenhauer regarded as a flamboyant and purely invented system of 
concepts, with no foundation in discernment.52 Fichte discarded the thing­in­itself 
altogether and pretended to derive both the formal and the material part of the phe­
nomenon from the ideal activity of the subject.53 Although, as Schopenhauer con­
tended, Fichte avoided the use of causal terms to describe this process, the “tortuous 
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deductions” by which he traced the ego’s positing (setzen) of the non­ego was mere 
subterfuge and a cover for the reintroduction of scholastic realism, whereby the laws 
governing relations between phenomenal objects (such as causation) were once 
again raised to the status of transcendent aeternae veritates.54
Having made this step, Schopenhauer maintained that Fichte had been obliged 
to invent a new power of knowledge called intellectual intuition. Although Kant had 
dismissed intellectual intuition as a human impossibility,55 Fichte deployed it to de­
fend his claim that the reflective philosopher (and he alone) can intuit transcendent 
processes, and thus catch the ego in its act of positing or causing the existence of an 
objective world. Schopenhauer thought that it was no accident that the later Fichte 
had baptized his world­positing absolute ego as “the good Lord,” thus giving his 
system “an extremely Christian complexion” in the interests of avoiding confronta­
tion with orthodox pieties.56
Culture and Idealism: The Case of India
But if Schopenhauer considered idealism’s introduction into Europe as a labor 
marked by fits and starts, misinterpretations, ostracism of its proponents, retractions, 
and the constant possibility of backsliding, then in his embattled commitment to 
this counterintuitive perspective he took solace in the example of India, where, so 
he claimed, idealism had prevailed since ancient times. A few passages on from his 
opening observation that “the world is my representation”, he quoted approvingly 
from an article by Sir William Jones to the effect that
[t]he fundamental tenet of the Vedānta school consisted not in denying the existence 
of matter, that is, of solidity, impenetrability, and extended figure (to deny which would 
be lunacy), but in correcting the popular notion of it, and in contending that it has no 
 essence independent of mental perception; that existence and perceptibility are convert­
ible terms.57
Schopenhauer glossed this quotation with the remark “[t]hese words adequately ex­
press the compatibility of empirical reality with transcendental ideality” or, alterna­
tively, the principle central to Schopenhauerian idealism, “no object without 
subject”.58
It appears, therefore, that, irrespective of his categorization of Indian idealism as 
sub­philosophical, Schopenhauer considered its statement to be more faithful to dis­
cernment than the hesitant attempts of Descartes, Berkeley, and the later Kant to pin 
down the “first fact of consciousness” in clear and distinct concepts. His sources sug­
gested to him that Indian idealism had rigorously insisted on the mutual interdepen­
dence of mental perception and the qualities of matter, and that Indian culture had 
remained faithful to this teaching throughout its history, preserving it from the re­
versals that had marred idealism’s fragile and uncertain appearance in Europe. This 
was possible because idealism in India had not been merely “the paradox of cer­
tain abnormal philosophers”,59 but the central presupposition of both its esoteric and 
popular metaphysical traditions:
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In India idealism is the doctrine even of popular religion, not merely of Brahmanism, but 
also of Buddhism; only in Europe is it paradoxical in consequence of the essentially and 
inevitably realistic fundamental view of Judaism.60
Schopenhauer tended to press this dichotomy between realist Europeans and idealist 
Indians to an extreme, at one point remarking that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
would have been received in a Buddhist country as
nothing but an edifying treatise on the more thorough refutation of its heretics, and the 
more salutary confirmation of the orthodox doctrine of idealism, namely that of the 
 merely apparent existence of this world that is present to our senses.61
Schopenhauer developed his conviction that both the exoteric and esoteric forms 
of Indian metaphysics concur in promulgating idealism on the basis of translations 
and commentaries published by the British scholars of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. 
He learned not only from Sir William Jones, but also from Charles Wilkins and Henry 
Thomas Colebrooke, that the popular literature of Hinduism, the Purāṇas, were at 
one with its intellectual texts, the Vedas and Upaniṣads, in teaching that the world is
Māyā, by which is understood nothing but what Kant calls the phenomenon as opposed 
to the thing­in­itself. For the work of Māyā is stated to be precisely this visible world in 
which we are, a magic effect called into being, an unstable and inconstant illusion with­
out substance, comparable to the optical illusion and the dream, a veil enveloping human 
consciousness, a something of which it is equally false and equally true to say that it is 
and that it is not.62
The convergence that Schopenhauer detected between the higher and lower 
traditions of Indian metaphysics was, in his view, a consequence of the fact that the 
latter had been properly subordinated to the former throughout Indian history, while 
European metaphysical speculation had been obliged, under threat of force, to con­
firm the allegorical doctrines of Judeo­Christian realism.63 Indian culture had man­
aged to retain the proper balance and sustain the true view of the world and life 
because, from its origins, its entire metaphysical orientation had been founded on 
the authoritative discernment of the ṛṣis, those ancient sages who had not only been 
gripped by the wonder that is the mother of all genuine metaphysics,64 but equipped 
with the intuitive and speculative capacities to escape it:
those who stood considerably nearer to the beginning of the human race and to the 
original source of organic nature than do we . . . possessed both greater energy of the 
intuitive faculty of knowledge, and a more genuine disposition of mind [größere Energie 
der intuitiven Erkenntnißkräfte, theils eine richtigere Stimmung des Geistes]. They were 
thus capable of a purer and more direct comprehension of the inner essence of nature, 
and were thus in a position to satisfy the need for metaphysics in a more estimable man­
ner. Thus there originated in those primitive ancestors of the Brahmins, the ṛṣis, the almost 
superhuman conceptions recorded in the Upaniṣads of the Vedas.65
The language of this passage makes use of themes that we encountered previously 
in Schopenhauer’s definition of genius. In both, the capacity to attain knowledge 
(Erkenntniß) of the conditioned nature of objects is attributed to a greater “energy” of 
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the faculty of intuitive perception (Anschauung), which releases the mind from its 
cramped absorption in individual concerns. But his description of the ṛṣis also indi­
cates that, in his view, the quality of their reflective minds (Geistes) was also “more 
genuine” than that of later generations, insofar as their thinking had not yet been 
obscured by an a priori web of concepts taken from an erroneous metaphysical tradi­
tion, enforced through state law, education, and social mores. This facilitated the 
development of their “superhuman conceptions”, such as that the world is māyā or 
representation conditioned by consciousness, animated by an inner force to which 
they gave the name Brahman. Their insights were later deposited in sacred scriptures, 
endowed with the authority of religious tradition, and set up as the basis of Brahmini­
cal education.
Schopenhauer’s theory of the founding role that the illuminations of the ṛṣis 
played in establishing idealism within Indian culture implies that, for the majority of 
faithful Indians, the authority of religious teachings concerning māyā have been in­
struments for correcting the “inborn realism” of their natural intellects. Their fidelity 
to idealism through the indirect route of māyā was therefore vicarious, with the result 
that someone requesting a justification of these doctrines from a Hindu or Buddhist 
would be referred not to the first facts of consciousness and the deliverances of dis­
cernment, but to the authority of the religious tradition and its exegesis by Brahmins. 
For the Indian masses, belief in idealism was therefore equivalent to Schopenhauer’s 
notion of a true conclusion from false premises, with faith in the intuitions of the ṛṣis 
acting as the false (or insufficient) ground of their belief in the dream­like status of the 
objective world.66 Their acceptance of this true but counterintuitive doctrine presup­
poses alienation of free judgment, whereby idealism is accepted as a religious “doc­
trine of faith”, while only the ṛṣis and others capable of discernment have accepted 
it as a “doctrine of conviction”.67 Furthermore, Schopenhauer’s official view of the 
contrast between Indian wisdom and European philosophy entails that even esoteric 
Indian idealism is wanting, insofar as it stems not from philosophical arguments and 
proofs but from the original evidence of the immediate and intuitive experiences of 
the ṛṣis.68
But, contrary to his official view, Schopenhauer’s historical surveys suggest that 
the “incontestable” authority of Kant’s philosophical proofs has made no material 
difference to the cause of European idealism. As we saw in the previous section, Kant 
smuggled realist elements into his philosophy in the second edition of the Critique, 
which led up to Fichte’s doctrine of the subject’s self­reflexivity, by which the phi­
losopher is able to intuit the non­phenomenal “absolute self­activity of the self”69 
prior to all empirical acts of knowledge. In opposition to this, Schopenhauer con­
tended that Fichte’s conception of the subject’s rational intuition was not only pure 
invention, insofar as there is no such faculty of rational or intellectual intuition of 
transcendent processes,70 but also an unnecessary obfuscation, insofar as the propo­
sition ‘I know that I know’ adds nothing to the proposition ‘I know’, and is therefore 
tautological.71 In support of his point that the subject knows objects but is never an 
object itself,72 Schopenhauer called upon the venerable authority of one of the ear­
liest portions of the Upaniṣads:
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He is never seen but is the seer, he is never heard but is the hearer. He is never perceived, 
but is the perceiver. He is never thought but is the thinker. There is no other seer but he, 
there is no other hearer but he, there is no other perceiver but he, there is no other 
thinker but he.73
It may seem rather anachronistic for Schopenhauer to assume that this passage 
is relevant to early nineteenth­century debates concerning the powers of the post­ 
Kantian subject, but one recent Upaniṣadic scholar has similarly maintained that it 
presupposes the non­reflexivity of the epistemological subject.74 However, the im­
portant point for this study is that Schopenhauer’s appeal to the Upaniṣad indicates 
that, even subsequent to Kant’s “real and great discovery in metaphysics”,75 Europe’s 
argumentative and philosophical idealism could still go astray and require correction 
from the non­philosophical and poetic idealism of ancient India. This is unexpected, 
since it tends to subvert the hierarchy between the two species of idealism that Scho­
penhauer so confidently assumed throughout his works. At one point, in the midst of 
venting his spleen on the vanity of missionary work in India, which presents the 
crude and realist metaphysics of Judeo­Christianity as an improvement on the idealist 
religions of India, Schopenhauer confidently predicted that
In India our religions will never at any time take root; the ancient wisdom of the human 
race will not be supplanted by the events in Galilee. On the contrary, Indian wisdom 
flows back to Europe, and will produce a fundamental change in our knowledge and 
thought.76
The assumption of this passage is that the “fundamental change” produced by Indian 
wisdom will be confined to the realm of Europe’s popular metaphysics, whereby it 
will be encouraged to catch up with the idealist “philosophy of modern times” and 
cease to work on behalf of its cultural marginalization. However, Schopenhauer’s 
appeal to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad to correct the faults of the argumentative, 
conceptual, and philosophical tradition subsequent to Kant suggests that, contrary 
to his official view, at some level he acknowledged the possibility that India’s poetic 
and intuitive idealism might also exert “a fundamental change” on “the philosophy 
of modern times”.
Conclusion
In relation to Schopenhauer’s Indian interpretation, our study has disclosed a funda­
mental ambiguity in his conception of the philosophical standing of ‘Indian wisdom’. 
Although his official view asserts an asymmetry between ancient Indian and modern 
European idealism, the sharp contours of his criteria become fluid under the pressure 
of insistent critical scrutiny. He categorizes Indian wisdom as pre­philosophical be­
cause the ṛṣis had articulated their insights in poetic or allegorical terms, employing 
the obscure figures māyā and Brahman to convey substantially the same opposition 
that Kant distinctly expressed as phenomenon and thing­in­itself and Schopenhauer 
as representation and will.77 Yet Schopenhauer’s quotations from Jones show that he 
was simultaneously aware that the later school of Vedānta had expressed the funda­
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mental idealist insight conceptually, as the mutual dependence of “existence and 
perceptibility”, or — in Schopenhauerian terms — subject­object correlativism. If, as 
he seems to have recognized, subsequent Indians had coined clear terms in which to 
express the original insights of the ancient ṛṣis, then this criterion seems toothless.
Schopenhauer’s second (and perhaps stronger) criterion for excluding Indian 
wisdom from the history of philosophy was his contention that, although the ṛṣis had 
accurately discerned the central elements of decided idealism, they offered no argu­
mentative or rational defense of these, but had communicated them through myths 
and narratives backed up by an authoritative religious tradition. As a result, ordinary 
Indians, incapable of metaphysical discernment, have been obliged to accept the 
truth of idealism on faith rather than conviction. Schopenhauer claimed that Kant’s 
statement improved on this by formulating proofs that “so clearly established” ideal­
ism, “that to raise even an apparent objection to it has not been possible.”78 In other 
words, whereas the ṛṣis had only established idealism as a determining cultural pre­
supposition, Kant made it into a permanent philosophical possession. As Kant’s true 
philosophical heir, Schopenhauer could maintain that, although it is possible to de­
rive “the individual and disconnected utterances that make up the Upaniṣads” as 
consequences from his own propositions, “my thought is by no means to be found in 
the Upaniṣads.”79 This is because the Indian classic does no more than enunciate, in 
oracular style, the conclusions of Schopenhauer’s system without their argumenta­
tive scaffolding. The implication is that his corpus has superseded the literature of 
Indian idealism, rendering it dispensable to a philosophically attuned reader.
However, this criterion similarly dissolves when we examine it in the light of 
Schopenhauer’s theory of the relation between intuitive discernment and philo­
sophical proof. As outlined above, he defined proof as a process in which certain 
and immediately known truths, “somehow intuitively apprehended”, are transformed 
into universal concepts and systematically related to their evidential bases. But if 
rational philosophical proof consists of no more than the formal presentation and 
defense of truths taken from immediate intuition, insight, or discernment, with rea­
son taking no part in the original labor of harvesting these truths itself, then Schopen­
hauer’s insistence that discernment is specifically philosophical seems mystifying. 
The simplicity, immediacy, and certainty with which he claimed that discernment 
grasps the truths of idealism — the mutual dependence of subject and object, and 
therewith the merely phenomenal nature of conscious experience — makes discern­
ment pre­philosophical. This is confirmed by his claim that every person has a pre­
reflective grasp of all philosophical truths in concreto, and that the task of the 
philosopher is to make these explicit to abstract reflection, and that he “neither ought 
to nor can do more than this.”80 But if the same basic process of discernment was 
equally at work in the ṛṣis and Kant, then a definite notion of the added value of 
Kant’s systematic ordering and demonstration of idealism’s content is still lacking.
This dilemma is thrown into sharper relief after a cursory reading of the Appendix 
to volume 1 of The World as Will and Representation — the “Criticism of the Kantian 
Philosophy”. Although the opening pages pay tribute to Kant as a philosophical ge­
nius and the “all­pulveriser” of prior dogmatic dreaming,81 it soon becomes clear 
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that, irrespective of his rhetorical tributes to Kant’s philosophy, Schopenhauer ac­
cepted virtually none of Kant’s proofs. Kant’s theories of the thing­in­itself and the 
a priori status of causality were central to Schopenhauerian idealism, but he dis­
missed Kant’s demonstrations of these doctrines as “correct conclusions from false 
premises.”82 But if it is questionable whether Kant’s formal and demonstrative pre­
sentation of idealism constitutes an improvement upon the poetic and disconnected 
utterances of the same position by the ṛṣis, then it is palpable that rational proofs that 
depart from false premises but somehow contingently alight on the correct point are 
no improvement at all! At this juncture, Kantian idealism seems to have no philo­
sophical advantage over Indian at all.
Finally, Schopenhauer’s historical surveys of idealism in European and Indian 
culture swing the balance in favor of the latter, for the “doctrine of faith” by which 
the Indian masses have accepted idealism has, according to Schopenhauer’s ac­
count, proved more durable than Kant’s idealist “doctrine of conviction”. Although 
Schopenhauer detected veiled evidence of discernment in a number of his European 
predecessors, he regarded all of them — including the “great Kant” — to have falsified 
the content of their intuitions by the time they fixed them in conceptual philosophi­
cal form. Schopenhauer seems to have been especially alive to the vulnerability of 
passing from intuitive discernment to rational articulation and proof in the medium 
of concepts, because — in the absence of any logic to guide this alteration — it is al­
ways possible that, at some point in the transition, the laws of individual psychology 
are likely to displace those of judgment. In the case of European thinkers, this per­
mitted the introduction of irrational elements into idealism’s conceptual articula­
tion, elements that stemmed from the pressure to confirm deeply entrenched cultural 
attitudes, or to avoid ridicule or persecution from the social guardians of orthodox 
belief. On Schopenhauer’s account, Indian idealism has been immune to such set­
backs: the ṛṣis early established idealism as a fundamental cultural presupposition, 
and their subsequent authority has ensured its status as a permanent possession with 
far greater success than Kant’s philosophical defense.
Schopenhauer’s uncertainty on the issue of whether idealism is better served 
when grounded on intuition and authority rather than reason and argument may 
simply stem from the many­sidedness and innumerable tensions of his own system. 
His philosophy bears the marks of his vacillations concerning the relative value of 
intuitive knowledge (Erkenntniß) over rational (Wissen), and also veers between a 
descriptive irrationalism (the human intellect is determined by the desires of the will) 
and a prescriptive rationalism (our thoughts and actions ought to be determined by 
knowledge alone). His explicit and official view of the contrast between European 
and Indian idealism presupposes the norm of Europe’s philosophical commitment 
to rational knowledge, argument, and proof, but this study has exposed his almost 
unconscious and unthematized recognition of the validity and historical efficacy of 
intuition and belief. His account of idealism in India indicates that it suffered no 
disadvantage by being founded on the personal experiences of the ṛṣis, and mediated 
to the people as a true conclusion from the false premise of faith in authority and 
tradition. In contrast to this, the hesitancy of European reason, as it struggled with 
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and against the deliverances of discernment, within a framework of cultural hostility, 
suggests that, historically at least, idealism has had a healthier time of it in India, ir­
respective of its lack of philosophical scaffolding.
Schopenhauer’s official view of the relation between Indian and European 
 idealism assumes that rational knowledge is superior to and an improved form of 
belief — an assumption that has had a long history in European philosophy. It stems 
from Plato’s characterization of someone who holds a true belief in the absence of a 
logos as akin to a blind person on the right road, while someone who holds the same 
belief, supported by a logos, is a sighted person on the right road.83 However, Plato’s 
conviction of the infallibility of rational knowledge has been one of those luxuries 
that few philosophers have been willing to indulge, especially in the present time, 
with the result that we are now presented with the choice of being a blind person on 
the right road, a blind person on the wrong road (happy in his or her ignorance of the 
fact), or a sighted person on the right road, whose sight presents so many roads that 
he or she is terrorized by the doubt that, perhaps, one of those other roads might be 
the right one after all.84 Reason or sight can do no more than present an array of pos­
sibilities, without formulating a secure method by which one might distinguish the 
true from the false. Were it possible to intuit or discern the right road immediately 
and certainly, then the person’s path might have been surer and his or her progress 
more rapid. But in the circumstance that he or she lacked these mental powers, what 
better way of correcting this deficiency than to be guided by conventions established 
by another who enjoyed such insight?
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